NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

DEFINE NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

EVOLUTION OF NIGERIAN’S FOREIGN POLICY. The evolution of Nigerian’s foreign policy cannot be understood without first knowing what is foreign policy? For the sake of this study I shall define foreign policy as a strategy or planned course of actions developed by the decision makers of a country aimed at manipulating the international communities in order to achieve certain national interest. From the above one could infer that foreign policy is the articulation of a country's national objectives and how such objectives is related to other countries. The evolution of Nigerian’s foreign policy could be divided into two, namely pre-colonial times and post-independent period. The pre-colonial times is when the entity Nigeria came into existence i.e. from 1914-1960, when the country was still under the colonial rule of the British government, while the second phase is from independence to date. I will focus on the second stage of the Nigerian’s foreign policy because that is when we can say that she really has an interest. From 1914- the later part of 1960, the interest of the British is the interest of the entity called Nigeria. A writer put is this way, the interest of her Majesty government in England is the interest of the then dependent state of Nigeria. The post independent period saw the formation of a truly indigenous foreign policy that was truly called a Nigerian’s foreign policy, with the coming of successive government the policy has been mortified. Since independence in 1960, the foreign policy of Nigeria has been like a chameleon, it changes in colour but its substance remains the same, Anyaele states as follows, the protection of our national interest has remained permanent in Nigerian’s foreign policy, but the strategies for such protection has varied from one regime to another. This means that all the government from independent to date has pursued the same goal and objective but in deferent way. The formation and execution of Nigerian’s foreign policy from independence to date has been carried out fewer than twelve administrations through the External Affairs Ministry. From the administration of Sir Balewa on October 1st, 1960 to the administration of president Obasanjo on May 29th, 2003, they have all pursued the same national interest, the prevailing domestic and international affairs determines the actions and responds of external matters. The strength or weakness of Nigerian’s domestic economy and socio-political conditions have been the basic problem of implementation of her foreign policy, Anyaele states that foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policy, it is the promotion of national interest at international level. One can therefore state that the evolution of Nigerian’s foreign policy stated when Nigeria gained independent as a sovereign nation and not when she was under the colonial authority of Her majesty government, because as a dependent nation she has no interest of her own except that of her colonial master.

Upon gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria made the liberation and restoration of the dignity of Africa the centrepiece of its foreign policy and played a leading role in the fight against the apartheid regime in South Africa.^[47] One notable exception to the African focus of Nigeria's foreign policy was the close relationship the country enjoyed with Israel throughout the 1960s, with the latter country sponsoring and overseeing the construction of Nigeria's parliament buildings.^[48]

Nigeria's foreign policy was soon tested in the 1970s after the country emerged united from its own civil war and quickly committed itself to the liberation struggles going on in the Southern Africa sub-region. Though Nigeria never sent an expeditionary force in that struggle, it offered more than rhetoric to the African National Congress (ANC) by taking a committed tough line with regard to the racist regime and their incursions in southern Africa, in addition to expediting large sums to aid anti-colonial struggles. Nigeria was also a founding member of the Organisation for African Unity (now the African Union), and has tremendous influence in West Africa and Africa on the whole. Nigeria has additionally founded regional cooperative efforts in West Africa, functioning as standard-bearer for ECOWAS and ECOMOG, economic and military organizations respectively.

With this African-centred stance, Nigeria readily sent troops to the Congo at the behest of the United Nations shortly after independence (and has maintained membership since that time); Nigeria also supported several Pan African and pro-self government causes in the 1970s, including garnering support for Angola's MPLA, SWAPO in Namibia, and aiding anti-colonial struggles in Mozambique, and Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) military and economically.

Nigeria retains membership in the Non-Aligned Movement, and in late November 2006 organized an Africa-South America Summit in Abuja to promote what some attendees termed "South-South" linkages on a variety of fronts.^[49] Nigeria is also a member of the International Criminal Court, and the Commonwealth of Nations, from which it was temporarily expelled in 1995 under the Abacha regime.

Nigeria has remained a key player in the international oil industry since the 1970s, and maintains membership in Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC which it joined in July, 1971. Its status as a major petroleum producer figures prominently in its sometimes vicissitudinous international relations with both developed countries, notably the United States and more recently China and developing countries, notably Ghana, Jamaica and Kenya.^[50]

Millions of Nigerians have emigrated at times of economic hardship to Europe, North America and Australia among others. It is estimated that over a million Nigerians have emigrated to the United States and constitute the Nigerian American populace. Of such Diasporic communities include the "Egbe Omo Yoruba" society.

NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Since independence, Nigerian foreign policy has been characterized by a focus on Africa and by attachment to several fundamental principles: African unity and independence; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-alignment and nonintervention in the internal affairs of other nations; and regional economic cooperation and development. In carrying out these principles, Nigeria participates in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Non-Aligned Movement, and the United Nations.

Nigeria has maintained meaningful relations with governments of U.K, U.S. and other Western powers. In November 1999, Nigeria and the U.K agreed on a joint military operations and training. Clearly, the present Nigerian government is committed to fundamental democratic principles and the return of political stability. To achieve this, Obasanjo is aligning himself with countries such as the U.K.

Although the continent of Africa has traditionally been the focus of Nigeria's foreign policy for several decades, economic diplomacy is emerging as another significant priority. In this regard, Nigeria hopes to promote economic co-operation with the global community.

Regional Relations

In pursuing the goal of regional economic cooperation and development, Nigeria helped create ECOWAS, which seeks to harmonize trade and investment practices for its 16 West African member countries and ultimately to achieve a full customs union. Nigeria also has taken the lead in articulating the views of developing nations on the need for modifying the existing international economic order in the context of the North-South dialogue.

The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a peacekeeping force composed primarily of Nigerian troops, played an important role in helping to end the Liberian civil war. ECOMOG forces also ousted the junta, which had toppled Sierra Leonean-President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in May 1997. Kabbah, elected as president in February 1996, was returned to power in March 1998.

In 1999 Nigerian ECOMOG forces intervened in Sierra Leone's civil war, paving the way for U.N. peacekeepers. The swiftness and success with which Nigeria has intervened since the founding of ECOMOG, and the leadership it has shown in supporting both ECOMOG and U.N. interventions, has gained Nigeria significant international notoriety for the strength and commitment it has shown as a regional force.

ECOWAS has announced the move towards a common currency. A lot of work led by Nigeria has made it possible for this goal to be achieved. However, Nigeria has been quite careful, warning that an accelerated pact may be to the detriment of the regional financial system. Therefore they recommend a much more considered approach to the monetary integration. As of mid-year no significant steps towards monetary union have been made.

Nigeria has enjoyed generally good relations with its immediate neighbors. A long-standing border dispute with Cameroon resurfaced in 1981, but relations were eased following a visit to Nigeria by the president of Cameroon in early 1982. In February 1996, tensions in the mineral-rich Bakassi Peninsula resulted in fighting and a tenuous peace.

Meanwhile, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) considers the border dispute. Tensions increased in the disputed peninsula in September 1998 and both sides sent troops to the region. However, both sides released 200 prisoners that had been detained since the dispute began. The ICJ awarded the peninsula to Cameroon in late 2002. Nigeria initially rejected the ruling but later backed away from that statement. In 2003, Nigeria said that it would take three years to cede control of the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon. Nigeria began the very slow process by giving Cameroon control over 30 villages near Lake Chad. In September 2004, the Nigerian Assembly asked for a referendum on the issue in the Bakassi Peninsula.

In addition to the Cameroonian dispute, a border dispute with Chad flared in the spring of 1983 but was eased by talks between the two governments. Nigeria's land borders, closed in April 1984, were reopened in March 1986.

In mid-August 2003, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo agreed to re-open Nigeria's border with Benin after having earlier in the week sealed off the border between the two countries because of alleged criminal activity across the frontier. The closure hit Benin's economy, pushing up the price of fuel and other imports.

Foreign Relations Political Overview:
Although largely unsuccessful, Nigeria played a major role for several years in attempting to negotiate an end to Sudan's civil war.

Africa Union

At its July 2-11, 2001, meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, the Organization of African Unity officially approved the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the new African Union. Former foreign minister of Cote d'Ivoire, Amara Essy, was elected the first Secretary-General of the African Union. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan reacted with the statement that, "This historic effort will require leadership, courage and willingness to depart from the ways of the past, if it is to do for Africa what the European Union has done for Europe." The goal of the African Union is to be a continental body that will pave the way to a better life for all Africans. Where the OAU was criticized for its lack of action on economic and social fronts, the African Union is charged with development as its primary task. Following a model based on the European Union, the African Union is intended to bridge the economic gaps between African countries and thrust the continent onto the world economic stage as a single entity. The African Union Bill was based on a convergence of South African president Thabo Mbeki's African development plan, and the Plan Omega proposed by Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade. It therefore adds to its economic mandate the political mandate that all of Africa should seek democratic consolidation.

There are significant criticisms to the new African Union, though. Some fear that too much faith is being placed in a document that makes more sense in theory than in practice. The strongest criticism, however, is that the Africa Union's largest force has been Libyan President Moammar Al-Qadhafi. The U.S. has made its objections to the Union clear no doubt due to a lack of trust in Qadhafi's motives.

Many African leaders backed the Union even though they also demonstrated a lack of faith in Qadhafi's motives. Even at the opening of the meeting of the OAU leaders noted that Qadhafi failed to even mention Africa's founding fathers even though it was Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah who was the founder of pan-Africanism some forty years ago. Indeed, Qadhafi has backed groups that are markedly anti-pan-Africanist in his own country. Other comments challenged the controversial role Libyan nationals often play in sub-Saharan African countries. Yet the most controversial position of Qadhafi no doubt was his statement that "We cannot be neutral here. We are here for the Africans, not the Europeans.

We are here for the blacks, not for the whites." With Louis Farrakhan, leader of the U.S.-based Nation of Islam movement, standing behind him, this statement was taken as an affront to increased western relations as opposed to the Union's goal of increasing economic ties with wealthier countries. The new African Union began its official functions during the spring of 2002.


Upon the election of President Obasanjo, the Commonwealth re-admitted Nigeria and the European Union lifted all of the sanctions imposed on the country in 1995. The sanction was a reaction to the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa, an activist slain by the Nigerian military regime of Sani Abacha. As a result of the annulled June 12, 1993, presidential election, failure to embark on a meaningful democratic transition, and various other human rights abuses, the United States had: -- Imposed section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act on Nigeria to refuse entry into the United States senior government and military officials and others who formulate, implement or benefit from policies which impede Nigeria's transition to democracy; -- recalled Ambassador Carrington for consultations following the execution of the Ogoni activists on Nov. 10, 1995 (the Ambassador returned to Nigeria March 3, 1996); -- suspended all military assistance; -- banned the sale and repair of military goods and services to Nigeria; -- taken the lead on consultations at the United Nations on appropriate measures. The United Nations Human Rights Commission on April 23 adopted by consensus a draft resolution condemning Nigeria's Human Rights record co-sponsored by the U.S. and many other nations, including South Africa. President Obasanjo's visit to former U.S. President Clinton was one of his first visits to heads of state. The United States welcomed the election of Obasanjo and re-established military ties with Nigeria.

Most sanctions imposed on Nigeria by the United States since 1993 have been repealed. The U.S. made its preference for Obasanjo known during the 1999 elections. Opposition parties, in fact, accuse the U.S. of accepting flawed electoral results because of their favor. (The Carter Center and other notable international observers ruled that there were significant electoral inconsistencies, but that it is unlikely these inconsistencies altered the final outcome.) In 1999 U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright hailed Nigeria's transition as one of the most vital in the world for U.S. national interests. A large number of U.S. officials visited Nigeria on aid, state and business missions later in the year. The importance, President Clinton clarified in his own trip to the country, is both the strategic interest of Nigeria as the largest and most influential country in western Africa and the significant oil reserves and exploration rights yet to be exploited.
While U.S. President George W. Bush did not detail his Nigeria policy early on, it appeared that at the top of the U.S. agenda, will be the expansion of the Nigerian oil industry, followed by increased stability and decreased corruption. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration began to show greater interest in the developing world, including Nigeria. In this regard, officials in the U.S. Defense Department have stated that cooperation on security interests in the region is of importance and will benefit both the U.S. and Nigeria. In this regard, a number of cooperative efforts have been implemented, including a defense assistance and training program in Nigeria, which is the largest of its kind in Africa.
The U.S. mission currently provides approximately US$10 million per year in aid for electoral assistance, military assistance and to make up for budgetary shortfalls.

FACTORS AFFECTING NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Since Nigeria became independent in 1960 its foreign policy, like that of most other countries, has witnessed successes and failures. The current debate on President Obasanjo’s list of Ambassadorial nominees sent to the Senate for approval provides Nigerian citizens with an opportunity to contribute to the debate on who should be nominated and why. I will leave relating to the "who and why" to observers more concerned with the internal political situation. My contribution will go beyond the internal debate concerning the disrespect of the "federal character" and the purported bias in these nominations. I will focus on the content and objectives of Nigerian foreign policy in the new millenium.

In his article on Obasanjo’s foreign policy, Reubin Abati, gives an interesting and complete overview of Nigeria’s foreign policy since its independence (1). He rightly points out that Nigeria has been extraordinarily naive by restricting its foreign policy to Africa as its cornerstone. It was a laudable goal before the 1990s, but its evolution is needed for Nigeria to meet the needs of today’s diplomacy as we move into the next millennium. Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy no longer suffices; a broader perspective is necessary. Although Nigeria hasn’t got the means and might to have a global foreign policy, it should endeavour to take more into consideration current trends in international relations and diplomacy such as globalization, human rights, and democracy.

In my opinion, successive military dictatorships in Nigeria have used the Africa cornerstone slogan to lure compliant like-minded African regimes to support their unpopular regimes. This was the price Nigeria had to pay for the support of dictatorial African states. Now, we are a democracy and we have to speak out and stand tall within the international community. We no longer have to beg for support from other military dictatorships for limited gains within African diplomatic circles. Africa alone should no longer be the one and only reason for the existence of a foreign policy in Nigeria. None of the important international diplomatic actors, such as the USA, France and Great Britain, build their foreign policy on only one pillar. Nigeria shouldn’t be an exception if it wants to play a role in current high level diplomatic circles.

DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Internal political events usually have a lot of impact on foreign policy. Nigeria is no exception as the following discussion will demonstrate. Nigeria should henceforth cultivate the idea, recognise and accept that military coup d’états are not solutions to internal political problems. If such were the case, governments in industrialised countries would have been toppled very often because of political crises. The solution is a culture of political dialogue and debate between opponents and Nigerians are up to that task. Encouraging political dialogue as the principal mechanism for the resolution of crisis situations would show the international community that Nigerians are a mature people worthy of a respectable place within the community of nations.

When Rueben Abati mentioned that the Babangida regime gave a lethal blow to Nigeria’s image abroad and its foreign policy in particular, he gave as examples the financial waste but omitted human rights abuses and the cancellation of the June 12 election at a time when every country, in particular the G7 and most OECD countries had made democracy, good governance, and human rights essential determining elements in international politics and in their relations with developing countries. It is worth noting that since the famous La Baule speech by President Mitterrand of France in 1983, democracy became a determining factor in relations between France and developing countries, in particular, African countries. This applied to other western states also.

Worse still, after its cancellation, no official inside Babangida's government was capable of giving cogent reasons for the annulment of the June 12 elections and accusations concerning human rights violations. The international community, therefore, rightly believed our top military officers were up to something. The aftermath was nothing to write home about. That was the beginning of Nigeria's misunderstanding with the international community – notably the USA, Canada, the Commonwealth countries, and the European Union.

The issue of June 12 had not been resolved when General Sani Abacha pushed the transition president Chief Ernest Shonekan out and took his seat without any agenda on how to improve relations between Nigeria and the international community, outside its traditional African brother countries. That coup d’état worsened the international image of Nigeria. No creditworthy transition programme was published; instead General Abacha embarked upon a self-aggrandising effort that led Nigeria to the brink of war because of the most flagrant human rights abuses any military regime had ever committed in the country since independence.

Nigeria became a pariah state with whom none except compliant African countries talked to. It was at this time that experienced diplomatic advice would have saved Nigeria. None was given a chance; instead a select delegation of incredible, though famous Nigerians, was sent abroad to explain the unexplainable to the international community. One such delegations led by Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu visited Europe, but its failure was obvious.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Under General Abacha, foreign policy was crudely mishandled. Records show that Nigeria was like a country without a foreign minister and a foreign policy during that period. No one person should be blamed for the absence of a foreign policy but someone should explain why there seemed to be no useful policy advice to General Abacha during the time (2). The questions to be answered include those relating to the aimless intentional tug-of-war declared by the regime against the international community.

Explanations should be given as to why that regime was incapable of foreseeing the devastating effects of the hanging of the "Ogoni nine", including Ken Saro Wiwa, and lastly, why there was no government official capable of making the regime to shift the horrible decision to hang the Ogoni activitists until the end of the Commonwealth summit. That regime unjustly imprisoned many people, including the incumbent President Olusegun Obasanjo, and hung Ken Saro Wiwa when all Commonwealth Heads of State and Government were meeting in Australia. These were all terrible acts and diplomatic blunders because they underrated the importance of internal policy including democratic reforms and the place of human rights in international relations and diplomacy.

When we hear some Nigerian's cry wolf today concerning the ambassadorial nominations by President Obasanjo, they should be asked why many ambassadorial positions remained vacant and no diplomats were posted out during Abacha's tenure of office (3). Nigeria’s diplomacy was grounded during the Babangida-Abacha era. This explains why the current government recalled all ambassadors and designated new ones. In Foreign Minister Lamido’s words, it is in recognition of the important roles played by heads of missions that they recalled them to dismantle the "old order" (4). Also, how would Nigeria have explained the confirmation by a democratically elected government of ambassadors who were apologetic to the military?

The annulment of the June 12 presidential elections and the hanging of the "Ogoni nine" were two lethal blows that those regimes gave to Nigeria’s image abroad. Nigeria’s bad image has not been repaired and those who contributed toward this should be humble in their utterances against the choices made by a democratically elected government.

NIGERIA’S SHATTERED PUBLIC IMAGE

Despite immense efforts by diplomats and other officials in the Babangida and Abacha years to explain Nigeria’s stance to countries outside Africa, their efforts were fruitless because Nigeria maintained an obsolete definition of national sovereignty. They argued that human rights and related issues were Nigerain internal affairs about which outsiders had no say. Yet, gone are the days when any ruler could sit down within the boundaries of his country and treat citizens as he liked without reaction from the international community. In spite of the existing double standards in the field, NATO intervention in Kosovo, former Yugoslavia, is an example. Henceforth, democracy and human rights, which in the recent past were considered in law and international relations as purely internal affairs, are becoming important determinants in foreign policy.

Though the recent crisis in East Timor (Indonesia) gave no pride for the international community, and in particular, the United Nations, the international community has tried various humanitarian and sometimes military rescue operations where there were human rights abuses. In Africa, Rwanda, during the ethnic crisis, was a case in hand. Nigerian policy and decision-makers should henceforth recognise that democracy and human rights are subjects of international concern and they should therefore inculcate these elements into the decision-making process.

Regarding image building, it was astonishing to observe how Nigerian diplomats and information ministry officials were incapable of formulating a message destined for international consumption to counter the international press campaign against Nigeria. The incapacity of Nigerian officials at the time to explain these decisions to the international public led to the deteriorated image of Nigeria abroad. The effects are very deep-rooted and years will be required to correct the image.

President Obasanjo and Foreign Minister Sule Lamido’s task is to bring Nigeria out of this dead end by consolidating democracy at home, respecting fundamental human rights and encouraging liberal economic reforms, good governance and transparency with a view to boosting international economic cooperation with G7 countries as well as the dynamic Asian economies (5). The task ahead is hectic and the choice of competent officials actors is therefore essential.

FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS

The policy actors in this immense task are both internal and external to the foreign ministry. Although it is primarily a foreign minsitry affair, it should be mentioned that internal actors such as the president, the foreign minister, ambassadors and embassies abroad, the press and the business community are all active players in the foreign policy formulation process. The role and place of our embassies should be redefined. A dynamic and performance-oriented foreign policy leaves no room for amateurism like in the past. Our ambassadors and embassies should sit up and live up to national expectations. Nigeria’s foreign policy has to produce results for the country and its citizens. The training programme for our diplomats should be reviewed to give them the necessary knowledge to practise the art and science of diplomacy because they are at the frontline of our foreign policy.

Our vital national interests have to be redefined. Does Africa still represent the cornerstone of our foreign policy when we have more respect from other countries than we get from African nations despite our whole-hearted commitment to them? If yes, what are the benefits we get from the choice? If the response is no, then we should reorient our foreign policy towards more profitable ventures like economic, scientific, cultural and technical cooperation with more advanced countries including Asia.

The economic development and well-being of Nigeria should henceforth be the mainstay of our foreign policy. We should revive and reinforce what was termed economic diplomacy by General Ike Nwachukwu. Fot instance, why would we continue to sit aloof and see Cameroun lay claim on Nigeria’s territory? In the name of African unity and good neighbourhood, Nigeria has sacrificed a lot and continues to sacrifice for our continent. That is praiseworthy but most southern African countries have forgotten the sacrifices made by Nigeria to bring them out of their woes. Sierra Leoneans and Liberians have forgotten the loss of lives by Nigerian soldiers in their efforts to defend unity and peace in these countries. Though Africa should not be forgotten, Nigeria’s interests should come first in all our foreign policy analysis and decisions. Retired General Danjuma wasn’t saying anything different when he said "Right now, we are becoming the United States of ECOWAS at very great cost to us. We think this is unaffordable to us now" (6). He further stated that Nigeria’s needs are enormous.

Regarding important sensitive internal policy issues that would have effect on our foreign policy, a decision-making forum comprising Presidential Advisers, top-level officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs, Justice, Economy and Finance, inter alia, should meet to discuss and access them with a view of defining a coherent policy. Officials from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies and the National Institute for Advanced Legal Studies should be invited to give expert opinion on such issues in order to avoid the diplomatic blunders of our officials during the Ken Saro Wiwa crisis.

Nigeria should therefore precisely define in policy terms what it’s cultural policy is and what it aims to achieve outside the country. What does cultural cooperation with foreign countries imply? Does it simply mean encouraging foreign artists to organise tours in Nigeria or foreign countries to establish flourishing cultural and language centres in Lagos, Abuja and elsewhere in the country? Where in the world does Nigeria have a cultural centre worthy of its title? In the field of defence, what is our defence policy? Does it simply mean protecting the external and internal territorial integrity of the Nigeria? Protecting the integrity of the country against who? In short, who are our enemies and who are our friends? What type of relations should we have with all our French-speaking neighbouring countries considering that all of them have over thirty years old defence and military pacts with France, one of the world’s leading military and industrial powers?

On Nigeria and its citizens abroad, what does the country intend to do to make them contribute in their own way to the economic, cultural, scientific and technological development of the country? In certain African countries, citizens residing abroad vote and take active part in political activities. What would Nigeria do to encourage its democracy to evolve toward such an objective? Nigerians living abroad should be encouraged to have closer relations with the motherland. Nigeria’s foreign policy should include all these actors for a more global approach to policy issues than in the past.

Democratically elected regimes have a wider scope and more leeway in policy decisions than regimes resulting from military coups d’états because they are legitimate. In Nigeria’s case, we have voluntarily or unconsciously restricted most vital foreign policy decisions or diplomatic initiatives to the African continent since we do not seem capable of going beyond Africa. We should no longer be satisfied with our fictional "giant of Africa" image and watch other African diplomatic "giants" like South Africa and Egypt work hard to get a name and maintain their place within the international arena.

FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

The scope of Nigeria’s foreign policy should no longer be limited to continental affairs. Its should be focused world-wide and geared toward the promotion of our cultural heritage, and scientific, economic and technical cooperation with viable partners. Its goal should aim at enhancing our national development, and military arrangements with NATO countries in order to give peace a permanent character in our societal needs and our sub-region. Finally, Nigerian foreign policy should aim at creating benefits for the betterment of the people. It should no longer focus on Africa without clearly defined policy objectives.

Such a policy shift would mean a very careful choice of external actors. Although I would not advocate dropping Africa, Nigeria needs to make a careful choice of our closest allies based not on the wealth or technological advancement of the partner but on Nigeria’s vital national interests in the cultural, economic, political, scientific and technical areas as well as in the military field. A commission comprising diplomats, top-level military officers, university professors and politicians should be set-up to review our foreign policy objectives and to redefine our vital national interests. Its mandate should be short and precise. These interests should be made the fundamental guidelines of all our foreign policy objectives in Africa, the European Union, America - both North and South, Asia and the Pacific. Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives should henceforth focus on the benefits of such policy for its people. President Obasanjo’s task would be to make the ordinary Nigerian feel the positive effects of the government on his or her life.

At another level, Nigeria’s foreign policy should encompass a clear opinion and strategy on major international issues such as the reform of the United Nations, bilateral relations between Nigeria and members of the European Union outside the ACP-EU framework, discussions with the dynamic Asian economies on how best to boost their investment in Nigeria, how to make G7 governments encourage more foreign capital flows to the vital areas of our economy through a liberal foreign investment policy. Lastly, as a representative of Africa at large, Nigeria should campaign strongly to get admitted as a permanent member of the Security Council. These achievements would make the ordinary Nigerian realise the usefulness of the country’s foreign policy in real, not abstract terms.

FORMULATION AND FEATURES OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

A 1989 publication by the Federal Military Government, Four Years of the Babangida Administration, summarized the priority issues of Nigerian foreign policy: the abolition of apartheid in South Africa; the enhancement of Nigeria's relations with member countries of the European Economic Community (EEC), the United States, the Soviet Union, and with other major industrialized countries to increase the flow of foreign investments and capital into Nigeria; and continued support for international organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Relations with other African states constituted the cornerstone of Nigerian foreign policy.

The Ministry of External Affairs was directly responsible for foreign policy formulation and implementation. Because matters were usually left in the hands of the minister and his officials, foreign policy positions could change radically from one minister to another, depending on the minister's orientation. In addition to the minister's immediate staff, there was a small foreign policy elite comprising other top government officials, interest group leaders, academicians, top military officers, religious leaders, and journalists. This elite exerted indirect influence through communiqués and press releases, as well as direct pressure on the government. In 1986 a conference--to which every stratum of this elite was invited--was held to review Nigeria's foreign policy and recommend broad policy frameworks for the 1990s and beyond.

Several factors conditioned Nigeria's foreign policy positions. First, the ethnic and religious mix of the country required cautious positions on some issues, such as policy toward Israel. Nigeria found it difficult to restore diplomatic ties with Israel and had not done so as of 1990 because of Muslim opposition and sympathy with the rest of the Arab Muslim world. Second, Nigeria's legacy as an ex-British colony, combined with its energy-producing role in the global economy, predisposed Nigeria to be pro-Western on most issues despite the desire to maintain a nonaligned status to avoid neocolonialism. In 1990 this pro-Western posture was reinforced by Nigeria's "economic diplomacy," which involved negotiating trade concessions, attracting foreign investors, and rescheduling debt repayment to Western creditors (see The Debt Overhang , ch. 3). Third, the country's membership in and commitment to several international organizations, such as the United Nations and bodies mentioned earlier, also affected foreign policy positions. Fourth, and most important, as the most populous country in Africa and the entire black world, Nigeria perceived itself as the "giant" of Africa and the potential leader of the black race. Thus, Nigerian external relations have emphasized African issues, which have become the avowed cornerstone of foreign policy.

These factors have caused certain issues to dominate Nigerian foreign policy across various governments, but each government has had distinctive priorities and style. During the 1950s and early 1960s, foreign policy aimed at proper behavior in the international system, and British authorities played a major role in Nigerian foreign relations. Consequently, the Balewa government stressed world peace, respected sovereign equality, and maintained nonalignment based on friendship with any country that took a reciprocal position. After the fall of the First Republic, critics asserted that the government had been too proWestern and not strong enough on decolonization or integration, and that the low profile had been embarrassing. Nonetheless, Gowon continued to keep a low profile by operating within the consensus of the OAU and by following routes of quiet diplomacy.

The civil war marked a distinct break in Nigerian foreign policy. The actions of various countries and international bodies during the war increased awareness of the alignments within Africa and appreciation of the positive role that the OAU could play in African affairs. Whereas white-dominated African countries had supported Biafra, the OAU sided with the federation by voting for unity. The OAU stance proved helpful for Nigerian diplomacy. Nigeria first turned to the Soviet Union for support after the West refused to provide arms to the federation, and after the war, a less pro-Western stance was maintained. At the same time, Africa remained Nigeria's top priority. In the mid- to late 1970s, attention focused on the liberation of southern Africa, on the integration of ECOWAS, and on the need for complete economic independence throughout Africa. These goals were included in the 1979 constitution: promotion of African unity; political, economic, social, and cultural liberation of Africa; international cooperation; and elimination of racial discrimination.